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 1. INTRODUCTION  
Philosophical enquiry can often surprise us by arriving at conclusions (or           
dilemmas) that run counter to our intuitions. The relationship between content externalism            
and authoritative self-knowledge is one of such areas. While there are strong reasons to              
think that content externalism is true, an even stronger intuition is at play that motivates us                
to hold on to the notion of us having privileged access to our own thought contents. After                 
all, the very suggestion that we may not have an authoritative self-knowledge seems so              
alien to us. Any philosopher who wishes to subscribe to both the stances will find               
themselves in an impasse for reasons that incompatibilists point out. This thesis is an              
attempt to offer solutions to such philosophers. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: with this chapter providing some             
introduction to the thesis, laying out what this thesis is, and is not, about, in chapter 2 and                  
its sections, I provide an overview of the twin-earth thought experiments that birthed this              
whole debate of the incompatibility thesis. In chapter 3, I introduce variants of             
slow-switching arguments and argue against both the variants, namely the content switch            
and the memory argument. In section 3.1, I argue against—what I call—the content switch              
argument and, in section 3.2, against the memory argument. I divide section 3.2 into two               
subsections each of which advances a separate strategy to attack premise 3 of the memory               
argument. Having argued against both the variants of slow-switching cases, I proceed to             
conclude that slow-switching cases do not succeed in establishing the incompatibility           
thesis in chapter 5. But before that, in chapter 4, I take on four potential objections to my                  
arguments. 
A few preliminaries before moving on: 
● I shall not be concerned with establishing the truth of either content externalism or              
of authoritative self-knowledge. In the context of this debate it is standardly            
assumed that externalism is true and that, if it is true, then it is not compatible with                 
us having authoritative self-knowledge. 
● In line with much of literature, this essay is concerned only with content             
externalism and not other kinds of externalism. Sometimes I use “externalism” as a             
shorthand for “content externalism.” For an overview of different types of           
externalism, please see (Carter et al., 2014). Also, as I’m only concerned with             
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 authoritative self-knowledge, the terms “thought content(s)” or “mental content(s)”         
refers only to “introspective thought content(s),” wherever applicable.  
● Recent empirical advances suggest that the commonly accepted intuitions about          
twin earth scenarios may, after all, not be as common as it was purported; the               
relevant intuitions vary with respect to culture and the language used. For a             
discussions on this, see (Tobia et al., 2017). This might be the case but I do not                 
concern myself with this worry and I situate my work wholly within the traditional              
context in which this debate operates—that is, the English-speaking world. 
● I do not take it upon myself to define what I mean by “external environment” (or,                
for that matter, “internal environment”). Considerable disagreements prevail on         
what an external environment is but, as it does not have any effect on the               
arguments of my thesis, I do not define it. The reader may understand it in any way                 
that they deem fit. 
● As will become apparent below, mental concepts play a key role in my thesis and               
thus cases concerning empty concepts (such as that of Boghossian’s Dry Earth            
cases) are beyond the scope of this thesis . Although Boghossian himself argues            1
that such cases do not threaten the status quo of the incompatibility debate             
(whichever side you subscribe to), in this thesis I do not consider such cases. 
● In line with the standard notation employed in cognitive sciences literature, I use             
capitalised words for concepts. For example, ‘WATER’ stands for the concept of            
water, and ‘water’ stands for the extension of the concerned object, i.e. water itself. 
● Finally, I’m not concerned with self-knowledge simpliciter, but with authoritative          
self-knowledge (also called “privileged access” or “first-person authority”). In this          
thesis, I occasionally use the term “self-knowledge” alone, but throughout the text,            
wherever applicable, it must be understood as though I’m talking about           
authoritative self-knowledge. 
 
When I say “concepts,” I mean the things that one’s thought expresses. It is akin to                
the meaning or the content expressed by a linguistic expression. When I say “reference,” I               
1 For a treatment of related issues, see (Boghossian, 1997). 
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 mean the object out there that the thought (uniquely) picks out . It is akin to the unique                 2
object that a linguistic expression picks out. Concepts and references are to mental             
contents as connotations and denotations (in Millian terminology) are to linguistic           
expressions; or, to use Carnap’s terminology, intension and extension respectively. 
With recent experimental evidences from psychological research questioning the         
very idea of our having privileged access to our thoughts, I do not endorse any               
philosophical stance towards the possibility of having, or not having, authoritative           
self-knowledge in this thesis. I merely argue against the plausibility of slow-switching            
arguments of the incompatibility thesis which holds that if content externalism is true, then              
it is incompatible with authoritative self-knowledge. I conclude that slow-switching          
arguments do not satisfactorily establish the incompatibility thesis. 
  
2 Boghossian (1997) distinguishes a referent from its extension and this distinction would take us to the                 
highly muddled discussions on natural kinds being rigid designators and, into essentialism. Since this              
distinction, or lack thereof, does not upset my arguments, I take it to the case that a term’s reference and its                     
extension are the same. For a discussion of related issues, please see (Ben-Yami, 2001). 
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 2. TWIN EARTH THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS—A SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I furnish the required background for the incompatibility thesis.            
Below, in section 2.1, I provide a brief introduction to Putnam’s twin earth thought              
experiment which concerns the role of external physical environment in determining the            
meaning of linguistic expressions; and Burge’s extension of this thesis to incorporate, in             
addition to external physical environment, the influence of socio-linguistic factors. I set            
aside section 2.2 to elucidate the incompatibility thesis, in which I pay specific attention to               
slow-switching thought experiment, the subject of my thesis. The reader who is            
well-versed in these topics can skip the entirety of this chapter, and jump to chapter 3. 
2.1 PUTNAM’S AND BURGE’S THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS 
Putnam was one of the myriad philosophers who attempted to answer the question,             
“what gives words their meanings?” The Fregean notion, which still remains as one of the               
central theses in this research area, was that meaning corresponds to the mental states of               
the agents. That is, if two words have same meaning then they must have the same                
reference. Or, in other words, two words with different references cannot possibly have the              
same meaning. Putnam found this contentious and argued that meaning is imparted, at             
least, partially, by the external environment, challenging the Fregean notion. In effect, he             
put forth the thesis of semantic externalism, the idea that meanings of words (or any               
linguistic expression) are individuated, at least, partially, by factors external to the agent.             
His argument involves a thought experiment which later came to be dubbed the twin earth               
thought experiment (Putnam, 1974).  
Imagine a distant planet in another galaxy or another universe that is exactly the              
same as that of earth in all respects—where there is a molecule-to-molecule physical             
duplicate for everything that is on earth. The only difference between earth and this “twin               
earth” (henceforth shall be called twin earth) is that while water is composed of molecules               
of H​2​O, the twin water (“twater” for brevity) on twin earth is made of up of some unknown                  
compound, say, XYZ. However, the thought experiment is set in a time when we haven’t               
discovered yet that water is made up of H ​2​O and thus, propositions like “water is H​2​O” are                 
not yet conceivable by the agents. Now consider an individual called Oscar and his twin,               
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 who is a molecule-to-molecule duplicate of Oscar, called Toscar (he is also called “Oscar”              
but we use “Toscar” for the purposes of differentiation). When Oscar says “water is wet,”               
he will be referring to the water on earth, i.e. samples of H​2​O molecules. Whereas if                
Toscar says, “twater is wet,” he will be referring to twater on twin earth, i.e. samples of                 
XYZ molecules. Having never had any contact with the other alternative, both Oscar’s and              
Toscar’s usage can only be directed at their immediate surroundings. If meanings are a              
reflection of internal mental states of the agents, then it is not possible for two               
molecule-to-molecule duplicates like Oscar and Toscar to say the same word and mean             
different things. Thus, Putnam argues, meanings are not in the head. A word of caution is                
in need. Putnam’s usage of a natural kind term like water has many unfortunate              
consequence such as Oscar and Toscar not being able to an exact molecule-to-molecule             
duplicate as Oscar’s body will be made up of H​2​O while Toscar’s that of XYZ; or, that the                  
unknown effect that twater may have on Oscar’s body which was used to water; and so on.                 
But for the purposes of argumentation let us set aside these technical deficiencies. These              
do not actually undermine the twin earth thought experience, for Putnam’s other examples             
such as those of elms and beeches do not face this problem. Withal, in line with majority of                  
the literature, I take up only water/twater cases in this thesis. 
Although Putnam propounded externalism for language, the basic notion of          
externalism is in use in a wide range of philosophical domains such as epistemology,              
historiography of science, and moral philosophy. In the philosophy of mind, it is a thesis               
that holds that contents of our thoughts are individuated by the relational properties             
between the mind and the world. Tyler Burge famously expanded Putnam’s thought            
experiment (which concerns only the physical environment) to demonstrate that          
sociolinguistic factors individuate our mental contents as well (Burge, 1979). For instance,            
factors such as language, social conventions, rituals, etc., also determine one’s thought            
contents. 
Suppose that Oscar is a normal adult living in an English-speaking country on earth              
where the term “arthritis” is used to talk about the disease that affects the joints. Imagine                
Oscar’s molecule-to-molecule duplicate, Toscar, living in a twin community (on twin           
earth) where the term “tharthritis” (twin arthritis, pronounced the same like arthritis, but is              
written as “tharthritis” for purposes of differentiation) is used to talk about the disease that               
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 affects both the joints and the muscles. Neither Oscar nor Toscar are medical experts and               
do not know the exact applicability conditions of the term. Now suppose that upon              
observing an inflammation on his thighs, Oscar thinks to himself: “I have arthritis on my               
thigh.” If he goes to his doctor and tells the doctor that he has arthritis on his thigh, the                   
doctor will correct Oscar that arthritis is a disease that can only affect the joints and not the                  
thighs. Thus, Oscar realises that he has a false belief. Now suppose that under similar               
circumstances on twin earth, Toscar exclaims to his (twin) doctor that he has tharthritis on               
his thighs. As in this community, “tharthritis” is a term that is applied to both the muscles                 
and the joints, the twin doctor proceeds to treat Toscar. In this case Toscar has a true                 
belief. Through this example, Burge argues that if contents of our minds are dependent              
only on the inner states of the agent, it is not possible for two molecule-to-molecule               
duplicates like Oscar and Toscar to utter the same sentence (or hold the same belief) and                
yet differ in truth values—as is the case here where one holds a true belief and the other                  
false belief. In this manner, Putnam and Burge forward the externalist theses.  
Thus, externalism (content externalism) in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that             
the content or meaning of a thought is dependent, at least, partly on the external               
environment—be it physical or social (linguistic community, for example). That is,           
contents of one’s thoughts are, at least, partly individuated by factors that are external to               
the agent. Internalism, on the other hand, denies this position and maintains that contents              
or meanings of thoughts supervene only on the inner states, or, in other words, on the                
intrinsic properties, of the agent. “Intrinsic properties” need not necessarily only concern            
standalone properties that are intrinsic to the agent; it may also concern relational aspects              
that are not outside the agent’s body. For example, two-place relations among neurons can              
be part of the base that determines mental contents. These are relations, instead of              
properties, but still count as “intrinsic to the agent.” 
Thus, in this section I outlined Putnam’s and Burge’s thought experiments which            
provides the broader context on what externalism is. In the next section, I sketch a short                
introduction to incompatibility thesis. 
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 2.2 INCOMPATIBILITY THESIS 
In the preceding section, we saw the “bigger picture” background of this whole             
internalism/externalism debate. In this section, I delineate how the above two thought            
experiments gave rise to the incompatibility thesis—the notion that content externalism is            
incompatible with authoritative self-knowledge. 
As we saw, content externalism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that the               
content or meaning of a thought is dependent, at least, partly on the external              
environment—be it physical or socio-linguistic. An unfortunate consequence of         
externalism is that, if externalism is true,—that is, if our thoughts are individuated by              
relational aspects between the environment external and the agent—then that entails that            
we cannot know our own thoughts without launching an empirical investigation of our             
environment. However, we have this traditional (at least, since Descartes), and often            
intuitive, notion that we have a certain privileged access to our own thoughts; that we can                
know our own thoughts without the need to investigate our environment; that we can know               
our own minds in more authoritative, and infallible (this is controversial), a way than we               
can know others’ minds. This notion is called authoritative self-knowledge. So one must             
either renounce their subscription to externalism or to us having authoritative           
self-knowledge. Or, in other words, these two are incompatible with each other. The idea              
that externalism is incompatible with our privileged access to our own thought contents is              
first put forth by Burge invoking, and expanding, Putnam’s twin earth thought experiment             
(Putnam, 1974; Burge, 1979; 1988). 
This observation inspired a flurry of activity in the philosophical circles. Paul            
Boghossian assesses Burgean worries and concludes that externalism is not compatible           
with self-knowledge (Boghossian, 1989). This paper, indeed, argues that given          
externalism, none of the available theoretical options to explain us having           
self-knowledge—namely our having privileged access to our minds through inference, or           
on the basis of introspection, or on the basis of nothing—can satisfactorily provide an              
account of authoritative self-knowledge and concludes that given externalism, we cannot           
have privileged access to our mental contents. Ever since the publication of Burge’s and              
Boghossian’s influential papers, the philosophical community has been actively debating          
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 these issues. There are, in effect, two positions on the relationship between content             
externalism and authoritative self-knowledge: the thesis that they are compatible is called            
compatibilism, and the thesis that denies it is called incompatibilism. Most externalists            
belong to the former camp while most internalists to the latter (but not necessarily so). 
In this short section, I provided a short overview on the incompatibility thesis. The              
incompatibility thesis is advanced through two strategies namely the reductio ad absurdum            
and slow switching arguments of which I’m arguing only against the plausibility of, as the               
title suggests, the latter. In the next chapter, I provide my arguments against both the               
variants of the slow-switching argument.  
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 3.  AGAINST THE SLOW-SWITCHING ARGUMENTS 
In section 2.2, I provided an overall background to the incompatibility thesis. The             
incompatibility thesis is forwarded by two class of arguments that follow different            
strategies. They are as follows: 
 
A. Reductio-type argument, due to Michael McKinsey, reasons that if externalism is           
true, it leads to the implausible conclusion that we can know ​a priori certain things               
about our environment that can only be known ​a posteriori (McKinsey, 1991;            
Warfield, 1992). It can be rendered as follows: 
1. If Oscar thinks that water is wet, then water exists. 
2. Oscar thinks that water is wet. 
3. Therefore, water exists. 
The idea is that if content externalism is true, (1) is true. (3) is an empirical                
proposition that cannot be known ​a priori but only upon empirical investigation.            
But our accepting (1) and (2) logically entails (3); that is, it indicates that (3) can be                 
known ​a priori​, which is not true. Thus, McKinsey argues, accepting           
content-externalism leads to counterintuitive conclusions and is, therefore,        
incompatible with authoritative self-knowledge. As this line of argumentation is          
beyond the scope of this essay, I do not concern myself with this. For              
criticisms/commentary on this, see (Boghossian, 1997; Brueckner, 1992; Pryor,         
2007) to name a few. 
B. Slow-switching argument​, the second strategy, judging from the vast amount of           
literature it inspired, could be considered as the most influential argument for the             
thesis of incompatibilism. Suppose that Oscar from Putnam’s original twin earth           
thought experiment is transported to twin earth without his knowledge in some            
way: say, he was secretly transported to twin earth while he was asleep and he               
wakes up ignorant of the switch. He is let to live there on twin earth for a very long                   
time. Since the state of affairs on twin earth is an exact replica of everything on                
earth, save for the molecular composition of twater, he does not notice any             
difference and goes on about his every day business as usual. This is termed as               
10 
 ‘slow-switching.’ The incompatibilists reason that, in such a slow-switching         
scenario, the contents of Oscar’s thoughts switch gradually from being water           
thoughts to twater thoughts unbeknownst to him and at a certain point will become              
fully twater thoughts. Suppose we tell Oscar about the switch later (without            
specifying ​when the switch occurred) and ask him to distinguish which of his             
thoughts were water thoughts and which were twater thoughts, he would be unable             
to differentiate. As Burge puts it: “...the person would have different thoughts            
under the switches, but the person would not be able to compare the situations and               
note when and where the differences occurred.” (Burge, 1988, pp.653). 
 
Incompatibilitists advance this argument to argue that in a slow-switched scenario,           
since Oscar can neither ​differentiate the switch in his mental contents before he was              
made cognisant of the switch, nor spot ​when his thought contents switched after he was               
being told of the switch, he does not know his own thoughts—that is, he lacks               
authoritative/privileged access to his own mental contents. Therefore, they conclude, if           
content externalism is true, it is incompatible with the doctrine of authoritative            
self-knowledge. A number of philosophers have attempted in a variety of ways to argue              
against this thesis (Falvey & Owens, 1994; Warfield, 1992; 1997; Gibbons, 1996;            
Morvarid, 2015; Parent, 2015).  
The slow-switching argument, in itself, has two variants. I dub the aforementioned            
argument the “content-switch argument,” and a variant of this parent argument is called the              
“memory argument” which first appeared in (Boghossian, 1989). In the following sections,            
I argue against both the variants of the slow-switching arguments with special emphasis on              
the latter. I provide one argument against the content switch argument and two arguments              
against the memory argument. The first of the two arguments I advance against the              
memory argument is an extension of my reasons to reject the content switch             
argument—thus, it is, in effect, one argument covering both the variants—and the second             
one is an independent strategy. Through my argumentation in the sections of this chapter, I               
aim to demonstrate that neither of the variants of slow-switching arguments succeed in             
establishing the incompatibility thesis. 
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 3.1 ​CONTENT SWITCH ARGUMENT 
Much of the literature in this debate holds that thought contents of a slow-switched              
agent (Oscar) change unbeknownst to the agent provided the agent stays there long             
enough. Although no exact figure had been arrived at, it is generally held that it will take                 
years together for this switch to occur (Brueckner, 1997). If Oscar was transported to twin               
earth and he spends a long time on twin earth while causally interacting with twin-earthian               
objects, his thoughts and linguistic expressions would gradually come to express           
twin-earthian concepts and refer to twin-earthian objects. This much is in consensus among             
both the internalists and externalists (Burge, 1989; Ludlow, 1995a, 1995b; Smith, 2003;            
Vahid, 2003). I deny that conceptual switches take place.  
Despite the fact that it was not explicitly acknowledged in the literature, I interpret              
this notion of automatic content switch to implicitly presuppose that concept nativism is             
true. If concept nativism is true, then it is possible for us to acquire concepts automatically                
without us knowing. Before I address this, let us take a quick look at what concept                
nativism and, its opposing position, concept empiricism are. 
There are two theses concerning the innateness of concepts, namely concept           
nativism and concept empiricism, and depending upon which conceptual structure one           
subscribes to (such as the classical theory of concepts, prototype theory, theory theory and              
conceptual atomism), one has to commit to varying levels of innateness of concepts (for an               
overview of the different conceptual structures, please refer (Laurence and Margolis,           
1999)). Nativistic accounts of mental concepts posit that most of our mental concepts are              
innate and that they are lying about in wait for appropriate stimuli to emerge and “activate”                
them for the agent to grasp . While this may appear counterintuitive, there are strong              3
reasons that motivates subscription to such a view. As Chomsky argues, the only             
explanation that can account for the puzzle of our language acquisition would be that our               
minds must have certain innate language learning capabilities. As it was dubbed, there             
3 We are not concerned with the extreme position endorsed by Jerry Fodor called “radical concept nativism”                 
which holds that ​all of our concepts are innate and that, no concept can ever be learned. Although Fodor had                    
had independent reasons to arrive at this unintuitive and disheartening conclusion, this extreme view has               
been severely discredited (Margolis, 1998). A form of concept nativism, which holds that there are many                
innate concepts that cannot be learned, survives from this proposal and is prominent in mainstream               
contemporary debate on this topic. 
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 seems to be a “poverty of stimulus,”—an impoverished stimuli,—that still does not deter a              
child from acquiring language (Laurence and Margolis, 2001). Concept nativism in the            
philosophy of mind is simply Chomsky’s supposition that there must be innate language             
learning capacities in children extended to mental concepts. All of the aforementioned            
conceptual structures commit to the existence of innate concepts with the commitment of             
concept atomism being the most; one can think of atomism as a form of radical concept                
nativism. 
Concept empiricism, on the other hand, holds that there are very few, if any,              
concepts that are innate (which are dubbed “primitive concepts”) and that most other             
complex concepts must be ​acquired through empirical means through our interactions with            
the world. Concept empiricism does solve many of the issues that concept nativism faces              
but also faces certain shortcomings. Again, although the debate whether our conceptual            
system is innate or empirical is unsettled, learning plays a key, if not the only, role in the                  
acquisition of new concepts. Both the nativists and empiricists agree that learning a new              
concept involves learning and only differ in which concepts are innate and the way              
(mechanism) they can be learned. 
The standard reading of concept atomism renders it on par with extreme concept             
nativism. That is, it was usually held that learning has no role in conceptual atomism but                
(Margolis, 1998) argues that there is a space for learning in this framework, too. For the                
purposes of my thesis, it wouldn’t matter which conceptual structures I favour. 
Now to return. To say that thought contents change through continued, causal            
interaction with twater is akin to saying when an appropriate stimuli such as twater is               
pressed forth, the concept TWATER emerges for Oscar to grasp. Or, in other words, there               
innately is, in Oscar’s conceptual system, a sustaining mechanism that will get triggered             
with the presence of twater thereby letting Oscar grasp the concept TWATER without him              
having to learn anything new. In concept nativism, the following holds: 
 
“…a sustaining mechanism [...] is all wired up in advance and simply waiting for an               
innately specified triggering condition to cause it to become activated. Far from it. What is innate,                
according to the model, is a general cognitive organization for creating a range of syndrome-based               
sustaining mechanisms in response to new natural kinds.” (Laurence and Margolis, 2011, pp.524). 
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 But it is also the case that all the models of conceptual structure, including the               
classical theory, hold that there are certain innate concepts (primitive) that cannot be             
learned. If natural kinds turn out to be innate in one’s mind, then that would provide the                 
incompatibilist an edge, for if that were the case, Oscar need not put in conscious efforts to                 
learn of twater. Margolis and Laurence, themselves nativists, provide a list of concepts that              
are taken to be innate according to contemporary concept nativists. They say: 
 
“Likely candidates for innate concepts include concepts associated with objects, causality,           
space, time, and number, concepts associated with goals, functions, agency, and meta-cognitive            
thinking, basic logical concepts, concepts associated with movement, direction, events, and manner            
of change, and concepts associated with predators, prey, food, danger, sex, kinship, status,             
dominance, norms, and morality.” (Margolis and Laurence, 2011, footnote: 21). 
 
We can see that this list does not include natural kinds. Notwithstanding that, let us               
grant that natural kinds are unlearnable primitive concepts which are innate in our mind’s              
conceptual system. (Margolis and Laurence, 2011), as a response to Fodor’s radical            
concept nativism (see footnote no.2), surveys various methods of concept acquisition and            
argue that all concepts, including primitive concepts, can be learned. 
 
“...Though the distinctive character of nativist and empiricist accounts of concept learning            
differ, for nativists, just as for empiricists, learning is absolutely central to the explanation of               
concept acquisition. The burden of this paper has been to show that the commitment to learning that                 
both sides share is perfectly cogent.” (Margolis and Laurence, 2011, pp. 538). 
 
Thus, so far I argued for the following: 
i) The classical theory of concepts hold that certain primitive concepts are            
unlearnable and are, thus, innate. If water/twater concepts are one such, then Oscar need              
not learn the twin concepts and that he will automatically acquire them. 
ii) Then we saw that the list of concepts considered primitive do not include natural               
kinds and thus natural kind concepts must be learned. 
iii) Finally I reasoned that even if we are wrong about this, primitive concepts still               
should be learned somehow. 
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 So I take it to be settled that learning a concept is inevitable for our acquiring new                 
concepts. But through this, I do not endorse that acquiring a new concept have always to                
be active; that passive, or semi-/unconscious learning, is not possible. Far from that. If that               
were true then that goes against the very idea of content externalism. What I claim is that                 
to be granted for our thought contents to change, some form of new concept must be                
learned, where the learning could be semi-/unconscious. In other cases (such as when we              
first encounter a new concept) it could well be semi-/unconscious but the only way in cases                
such as water/twater, arthritis/tharthritis that we can learn the new twin concept is through              
learning that one crucial difference that separates the two. There is no other way how               
Oscar would come to know of twater . Similarly, for Twin Oscar (Toscar), his default              4
concept would be that of twater and his slow switching to earth would require that he                
learns how to distinguish water and twater. 
To take another example: consider how certain words, through passage of time,            
change their meaning. An agent who lives through this change can be thought of being               
slow switched. The critic might say that the agent’s hought contents would have, along              
with his deference to community for correct usage, slowly changed along with the changes              
in the meaning of the word. For this purpose, we can assume that the agent was in                 
comatose for, say, 100 years and wakes up without any idea that the meaning of the word                 
they once knew has completely changed (assume that he gets to live a very long life).                
When this agent wakes up and goes about interacting with others, using terms such as               
“gay,” (which only meant happiness before he went to coma and now almost always means               
homosexuality), “salad,” (whose meaning has changed to accommodate inclusion of meat           
parts, too, in the mix) and so on. Unless this agent runs into severe repercussion which                
results in him learning of the changes and thereby updating/changing his concepts GAY             
and SALAD, he will continue to use them in only the way that ​he intended. If the                 
community were to be so understanding that they don’t bother to correct him or educate               
him and communicate accordingly with him, there is no way his thought contents would              
change. Thus, in this example unless the agent were to make a conscious effort to               
distinguish between the new twin concepts, say, SALAD​1 and SALAD​2​, the agent’s            
4 One can, of course, ask: what about possessing concepts through deference, then? I address this objection                 
later in this thesis. Please refer section 4.1. 
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 thought contents will not change. A similar example is provided in section 4.1 for              
ARTHRITIS and THARTHRITIS. 
Thus, no matter what the conceptual scheme of our mind is, in cases like the               
slow-switching scenario, it is absolutely crucial for Oscar to learn the concept TWATER in              
order to acquire it. In the event that Oscar does not make active efforts to learn the concept                  
TWATER, he shall never come to acquire it, and thus, in his interactions with the               
twin-earthians, his usage of “water” will express in his mind the concept WATER, whereas              
in the twin-earthians’ usage of the same word will express the concept TWATER . In the               5
event that Oscar engages in active cognitive participation to learn the new concept             
TWATER, ​—​say by learning the one unique feature that distinguishes water and twater: the             
molecular structure​— ​he would come to know the change in his mental concepts. Therefore             
it cannot be claimed that in either of the cases​— ​before and after learning the new concept                
TWATER​— ​he does not know his own thought contents. 
Now if all of this fails to convince a critic, consider the following case: it was said                 
that Oscar has no clue about molecular structures and so on. Let us suppose that Bob is a                  
chemist who has been slow-switched. If asked to explicate what he means by water, he               
would provide a list of chemical properties of water (all of which are shared by twater) and                 
will also say that it is made up of molecules of H ​2​O. To this, a twin-earthian chemist                 
would tell Bob that twater is made up of XYZ. Now I see no reason how and why Bob                   
who is a chemist, whose concept of water (H​2​O molecules) would automatically switch             
from being WATER to TWATER without him learning the one crucial difference that             
separates the two. Simply put, I just maintain that, not only for the slow-switched chemist               
Bob, but also for the chemically-ignorant Oscar, the only way their concepts change—in             
cases similar to those discussed in slow switching scenarios—is for them to make active              
efforts to learn the difference between the two concepts. 
One seemingly severe objection that could be raised can be phrased as follows: by              
granting that an agent’s awareness is needed for thought contents to change, don’t you              
downplay that an agent can come to possess certain concepts through semi-/unconscious            
means, through deference, and so on? Does this not go against the very thesis of content                
5 This supposition may give rise to an objection that it signifies that essentially a miscommunication is taking                  
place. I discuss this objection in section 4.3. 
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 externalism? This is a valid criticism but I maintain that this does not necessarily upset               
externalism. My claim is that only in cases that slow-switching arguments deal with the              
content switch does not happen—that is, two mutually indistinguishable environments          
which have only one key difference that is unknown to the agent. This does not, in any                 
way, downplay the influence of the environment on individuating Oscar’s thought           
contents. The new environment does exert and influence the occurrent thought contents            
(memorial contents are a different story and I deal with it in the following section) of the                 
slow-switched agent. The agent has his thought contents informed by the new environment             
and in the case of the agent not knowing the crucial differences, as is the case now, the                  
agent would only be influenced by factors from the new environment that are also shared               
by the old environment; and thus ‘picks up’ the same factors that end up determining the                
agent’s mental contents. In the absence of having learnt the new concept, the agent, having               
‘picked up’ the same old factors from the present environment, will only be able to think of                 
the old concept. This becomes even clearer when we consider the case of slow-switched              
Dry Oscar (Doscar). Please refer section 4.1 for further details. 
Now, to summarise: assuming the truth of externalism, my arguments against           
content switches can be presented as follows: 
1. If content externalism is incompatible with authoritative self-knowledge, then in a           
slow switched situation, Oscar’s occurrent thought contents can, owing to the new            
environment’s influence on his mental contents, change unknown to him. 
2. Our best theories of concept acquisition mandate that all concepts, no matter how             
primitive, are to be learned, and that there are no concepts that change/gets added              
to our conceptual repertoire without us acquiring it through learning. 
2.1. Learning can be semi-/unconscious. 
3. Possession of any concept, thus, requires some form of learning. 
4. We can grant that Oscar possesses both WATER and TWATER concepts only if he              
can distinguish between the two, in the event that all the n-1 properties are shared               
between water and twater. 
5. The only way Oscar can distinguish between WATER and TWATER is by learning             
the corresponding differences in their molecular composition. 
6. Before being told of the switch, Oscar does not learn the molecular compositions             
and thus, cannot distinguish between WATER and TWATER concepts. 
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 6.1. If he was told of the switch, Oscar will learn the differences in molecular              
composition and can, thus, distinguish between WATER and TWATER. 
6.2. In this case, he will be able to know that his thought contents have changed               
(thus, his thought contents change ​not unknown​ to him). 
7. By 5 and 6, we cannot grant that Oscar possesses both WATER and TWATER              
concepts; and so is left with his old WATER concept alone, using which he keeps               
miscommunicating with the twin earthians. 
8. By 7, we can ascertain that Oscar’s occurrent thought contents do not change             
unknown to him in both the cases where he was, and he was not, told of the switch. 
9. Thus, by 8 and 1 (modus tollens), it is not the case that content externalism is                
incompatible with authoritative self-knowledge. 
Since as I argued above, the thought contents of a slow-switched agent do not              
change unknown to the agent, slow-switching argument does not establish incompatibility           
thesis. 
3.2 MEMORY ARGUMENT 
The memory argument is a variant of the slow-switching argument. Commenting           
on the Burgean notion of occurrent thoughts having a self-verifying status, Boghossian            
argues that content externalism, if applied to contents of one’s memories, would be             
incompatible with self-knowledge (Burge, 1988; Boghossian, 1989). The conclusion of          
Boghossian’s argument in this paper can be also thought of as the sceptic’s argument to               
self-knowledge. The argument, as rendered by Peter Ludlow, is as follows (Ludlow,            
1995b): 
1) If S forgets nothing, then what S knows at t1, S knows at t2. 
2) S forgot nothing. 
3) S does not know that ​p​ at t2. 
4) therefore, S did not know that ​p​ at t1. 
Naturally, the memory argument has seen a variety of responses. For example,            
Sven Bernecker writes that this formulation is built upon the assumption that presentist             
externalism is true, but that when it comes to memorial contents, only pastist externalism              
applies; and that with this, memory argument does not succeed (Bernecker, 2004).            
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 Anthony Brueckner, on the other hand, rejects premise 2 by arguing that not forgetting              
something does not imply having an intact knowledge of the past; that one can lose               
knowledge in other ways besides forgetting, for example, in the event of a new defeating               
condition (Brueckner, 1997). Curiously, others like Sanford Goldberg even suggest that the            
memory argument can be forwarded without involving the faculty of memory at all and              
that the same conclusion can be reached by having the agent repeat a verbalised thought all                
the time (Goldberg, 1997). For a brief survey of various attacks on the above formulation,               
see (Ludlow, 1999). Also see (Falvey, 2003). 
In addition to these aforementioned challenges, I take upon myself to argue against             
the memory argument through two strategies, where both deny premise 3 on different             
grounds. The first one of them is regarding the acquisition of concepts, similar to the one I                 
gave in 4.1, applied to the memory argument. The second strategy is based on how               
memory actually works and that, all things kept equal, premise 3 is false. Let us see the                 
first of my argument below. 
3.2.1 DENIAL OF CONTENT SWITCH FOR MEMORY 
In this subsection, I deny premise 3 directly by appealing to my argument in section               
3.1 that concept​— ​and, thus, consequently, the reference​—switch is not automatic. The           
memory argument, too, just like the content switch argument, implicitly assumes that            
Oscar’s thought contents have changed from being water thoughts to twater thoughts            
without him knowing it, and when Oscar remembers what he thought of at t1 (some               
particular water thought), he actually ‘remembers’ twater thoughts at t2. In Ludlow’s            
formulation above in 3.2, ​p is a reflexive proposition of the form, “S thinks that ​q​,” in                 
which ​q is a first-order proposition. In our case, let ​p be “S thinks that water is wet,” in                   
which ​q stands for the first-order proposition, “water is wet.” And, on twin earth,              
correspondingly, let ​p’ stand for “S thinks that twater is wet,” and ​q’​, respectively, for               
“twater is wet.” Now, according to the memory argument, Oscar thought that ​p at t1 and                
when he remembers this thought at t2, he remembers ​p’ as his thought contents have               
changed. If we grant that Oscar knew that ​p at t1, and since he remembers everything, he                 
should know that ​p at t2, too, but that’s not the case. Therefore, Oscar does not have                 
self-knowledge. 
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 However, as I argued above in section 3.1 that no matter how long Oscar lives on                
twin earth and causally interacts with twater, provided he doesn’t make any efforts to              
actively learn the concept TWATER, his thought contents would never switch. Having not             
made cognisant of the switch, Oscar does not suspect anything and consciously does not              
learn the twin concept TWATER. Since he never learned it, he only knows about the               
concept WATER and thus, I argue that Oscar’s thought contents never change from p to               
p’. Therefore, it is not the case that when at t2 Oscar upon remembering his thought at t1,                  
he remembers that ​p’ and not that ​p​. Thus, I reject premise 3 in Boghossian/Ludlow’s               
memory argument and avoid the incompatibilist’s conclusion. 
Thus far, I argued that if Oscar does not know that he had been switched to twin                 
earth, he would not consciously make efforts to learn the new concept, and thus, in effect,                
his thought contents would remain the same i.e. water thoughts, which does not lead to him                
lacking self-knowledge. I now consider a case where Oscar puts in the effort and acquires               
the new twin concept. Although, the domain of discussions in memory argument usually             
do not consider cases where Oscar becomes cognisant of the switch, John Gibbons             
mentions that loss of knowledge is possible ​only [emphasis mine] if Oscar becomes aware              
of the switch (Gibbons, 1996). Thus, it has become paramount to address such a case, too,                
and defend my claims. 
Let us now suppose that Oscar was told that he had been transported to twin earth,                
say, at t*, where t* is some time in between t1 and t2 (imagine t1 as 2009, t2 as 2019 and                     
then t* shall be, say, 2012) . Upon this information, let us suppose that Oscar consciously               6
learns about the new concept TWATER. As the only difference between water and twater              
is the molecular structure, the only way for Oscar to be able to discern them is to learn the                   
molecular differences between the two. If concepts were to be thought of as mental              
representations (RTM) —given the lack of consensus, I favour RTM just for the sake of              7
6 As is customary of philosophical debates, especially when thought experiments are concerned, often little to                
no attention at all is provided on what kind of impact will we see in the real world.If such would happen,                     
commonsense tell us that we would see Oscar revolting, not willing to cooperate, him slinging               
anti-government (or whoever responsible) slogans for his transportation without his consent, and so on. I               
would like to acknowledge this deficiency but wish to carry on. So, for the sake of argument, let us suppose                    
that Oscar makes peace with his current situation and tries to adapt to the new environment. 
7 There are two other theses regarding the ontology of concepts: i) as the ability to discern one concept from                    
the other (like ability to tell apart CAT from non-CATS) and ii) Fregean senses. It does not matter what                   
conceptual ontology we subscribe to as it is not relevant to this thesis and does not have any effect on this                     
subject matter. 
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 explicature here—then both the concepts WATER and TWATER would include, in           
Oscar’s mind, almost identical representations . The only way through which Oscar can            8
tell them apart is through inculcation in their representations of the idea (somehow) that              
their molecular structures vary, namely that one is made up of H​2​0 and that the other of                 
XYZ. 
If Oscar entertained a thought that water is wet at t1, and remembers it at t2, then                 
having learnt that two mutually indistinguishable objects, namely that water and twater,            
exist, he would naturally wonder if what he had had was water thought or twater thought.                
But if he remembers that t1 was before his switch and that he learnt of twater at t*, he                   
would be able to ascertain that he thought of water since he did not know of twater until t*. 
Even if he has no clue that t1 was at a time before his switch (if we don’t say when                    
exactly his switch occurred) he would be still able to explicate that he may have thought of                 
one of the two kinds of almost-indistinguishable objects and that he is unable to say which                
one he thought of at t1. Thus, in this case, too, it is farfetched to declare that Oscar does                   
not know that ​p at t2; he knows that ​p or ​p’ at t2, which is not enough to deny him                     
self-knowledge (more on this below). Self-doubt does not exclude self-knowledge; only           
not knowing what one thought of does. Being confused about what one thought of is not                
sufficient ground to claim that Oscar has no self-knowledge. 
In order to discuss this above case, we must look at the following two kinds of                
cases. Burge (2013) demarcates what he terms Disjunct Type cases and Amalgam type             
cases. The former is when two different concepts coexist in an agent’s mind and one               
cannot be applied for the other; the agent may, however, mistakenly apply one for the other                
if they are of the water/twater type objects (i.e. nutually indistinguishable). The latter is              
when there are two concepts of which one is essentially the broadening of the other               
concept. For example, in arthritis/tharthritis case, the concept THARTHRITIS applies to           
inflammation of ​both the joints and the muscles, whereas the concept ARTHRITIS applies             
only to the inflammation of joints. Thus, if one were to use, say, twin Bert, who was                 
slow-switched to earth, who has no idea of the earthian concept ARTHRITIS, the term              
8 Curiously, if an incompatibilist were to grant that, practically speaking, WATER and TWATER are the                
same since they both have the same functions (quenching, boiling, etc.), and that there is no point in                  
distinguishing them two, they collapse under the weight of their own argument as, if one grants this, one                  
cannot claim that Oscar does not know his own thought content, for in any case, he will have knowledge of                    
either water or twater and that since they are both the same, there is no switch in Oscar’s thought contents. 
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 “tharthritis” to mean he has pain in his knees, it will be a valid usage . Amalgam type cases                  9
are, thus, cases where one (twin) concept is essentially a ​broadening of the other concept.               
Having categorised these two cases, Burge argues that neither disjunctive or amalgam type             
cases make sufficient grounds to grant that the agent has no self-knowledge (Burge, 2013).              
Also, as a side note, Kevin Falvey takes a radical stance and argues that mental contents                
from memory are individuated by present environment, and grants that in order to have              
authority over our memorial thought contents it is enough for the agent to merely possesses               
a disjunctive concept,—in the terminology he uses,—namely, ZWATER (Falvey, 2003).          
Thus, disjunctive or amalgam type cases do not threaten our having authoritative            
self-knowledge. 
But even without resorting to the radical stance that Falvey (2003) takes, I can still               
save my argument: if a critic were to add that in the debate over incompatibility,               
philosophers usually have something stronger in their mind (non-disjunctive or          
non-amalgamated type case) when they talk about first person authority and that my             
allowing disjunctive type cases weakens our notion of privileged access to our mental             
contents, then, to such a critic, I would answer that, yes, it usually is the case but my                  
knowing that I thought of that-p-or-p’ is more direct and authoritative than my knowing              
that you thought of that-q-or-q’. In this way, even in disjunctive/amalgam type cases, I              
have far more privileged access than I can have have of your mental contents. Thus, I think                 
this objection does not threaten my claims here.  
In this subsection, I attacked premise 3 of the memory argument due to             
Boghossian. I rejected premise 3 in all possible scenarios: when Oscar has no clue that he                
has undergone slow-switching, when Oscar was told of the switch but does not know when               
exactly he was switched, and when Oscar was told of the switch and exactly when. In all                 
the scenarios, we can see that premise 3 does not hold up. This concludes my first strategy                 
against the memory argument. ​In the next subsection, I forward a different strategy to              
attack, again, premise 3. 
9 Note that the amalgam type concepts cannot work under all conditions. For example, in this case, if twin                   
Bert uses the term ‘tharthritis’ to refer to the inflammation of his muscles (and not joints), he will get                   
corrected by the earthian doctor which would lead to narrowing of his concept THARTHRITIS. It is not                 
known what would happen if twin Bert was not informed of the switch and happens to accidentally have such                   
a “narrowing” of his twin concept. As this is not such a pressing issue and as this is not concerned to this                      
thesis, I shall skip ruminating on this further. 
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 3.2.2 RECONSTRUCTIVE MEMORY 
There indeed is a huge chasm between philosophers of mind and cognitive            
sciences/psychology. Although brain studies originated as a field of subjecting to empirical            
observation what philosophers of mind have been positing for centuries, philosophers are            
often blind to the developments in these domains . This subsection deals with one such              10
‘missing out’ by philosophers of developments in psychology that led them to argue in              
ways that do not agree with relevant empirical data about memory and remembrance. In              
the above section 3.2.1, I rejected premise 3 in Ludlow’s formulation as a consequence of               
my arguments in section 3.1. In this subsection 3.2.2, I provide a different line of argument                
to reject, again, premise 3. 
Attempts at undermining the memory argument usually challenge it on the grounds            
of entailment, on the grounds of how different memory as knowledge is, and so on               
(Bernecker, 2004; Brueckner, 1997; Falvey, 2003; Goldberg, 1997). I reject premise 3 on             
the grounds that the assumption made by incompatibilists on how memory works is             
different from how it actually works. To reach to that end, firstly, I argue that Ludlow’s                
contention that contents of memory are individuated by current environment rests on a             
fallacious assumption; secondly, I provide an account of how memories actually work.            
Putting these two together, I find myself in an able position to reject premise 3 and thus,                 
the memory argument does not lead to an incompatibilist conclusion. Let us look at my               
first argument now: 
Ludlow, himself, an externalist argues that content externalism does not undermine           
self-knowledge in (Ludlow, 1995b). Although I, too, argue for the same ends, I find it               
implausible the way Ludlow argues: he posits that we defer to the linguistic community for               
the contents of all our mental contents (including memories), and holds that the contents              
are determined by current environment. He says, “...I am prepared to defer to the members               
of my linguistic community for the content of 'chicory' and this deference applies likewise              
to my memories.” (Ludlow, 1995b, pp.158). On individuation of memorial contents, in his             
own words: 
10 There are, nonetheless, of late, philosophers of mind like Peter Carruthers who closely follow cognitive                
sciences/psychology and its developments and apply the learnings in their philosophical investigation            
(Carruthers, 2011). 
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“...But notice that that recollection will have its contents fixed by current environmental             
conditions. As those environmental conditions shift, the content of my memory of this second-order              
mental episode will shift (just as the contents of memories of first order thoughts shift).” (Ludlow,                
1995b, pp.159). 
 
That is, Ludlow endorses presentist externalism when it comes to memorial           
contents; he holds that contents of memories, too, like occurrent thoughts, are individuated             
by current environmental conditions. The other two kinds of externalism that are available             
are pastist and futurist externalism which holds that contents of memories are individuated,             
respectively, by past and future environmental conditions. Of these stances, futurist           
externalism is not endorsed by many philosophers with few exceptions such as Henry             
Jackman (1999). However, even intuitively, I think that pastist externalism makes much            
more sense than presentist externalism. Does it not feel counterintuitive to think that the              
current environment has the ability to tamper with things we actually remember, the             
contents of which must have been, provided we do not forget anything, already fixed in our                
mind? Occurrent thoughts may very well be individuated by current environment but            11
contents of memory can only be individuated by past environment, as memorial contents             
are not about what is the case now, but is about ​what was the case back then. It could be                    
the case that both past and present environments have remained unchanged but that is not               
to say that the current environment individuates memorial contents; only the past            
environment can. 
Bernecker succinctly puts the notion that individuation of the contents of memory            
are dependent not on current environment but on the original environment in which the              
memory was formed as follows: 
 
“The memory claim is true if and only if it is an accurate representation of some past states                  
of affairs. Given temporal externalism, however, the concepts used in memories are determined by              
the present environment. But if the concepts employed in memories refer to present affairs so do the                 
truth conditions of memories. And if the truth conditions of memories refer to present affairs, the                
memory claim in question would turn out false if there were no longer a tree in S's garden. But this                    
11 When I write “fixed in the mind,” it might seem that I suggest a form of content being stored in brain’s                      
“memory bags.” But I use this only as a manner of speaking since I’m not advocating this view. The                   
argument below deals precisely with this. 
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 is surely absurd. [...] Thus I conclude that the only viable form of externalism about memory says                 
that memory contents are determined by past environmental conditions.” (Bernecker, 2004,           
pp.611-612). 
 
Thus, having seen reasons to reject presentist externalism and embrace pastist           
externalism, let us move on to see how memory actually works, which is pretty much at                
loggerheads with what philosophers in this debate considered to be the case: 
It was long held that our memories are stored in different parts of the brain and that                 
every time we recollect,—that is when we attempt to decode—we reactivate the same             
neural activity—the same, as it were, mental pathway—in the brain that initially led to the               
encoding of the contents of our memories. This standard folk view sees memories as things               
that are essentially stored in “memory bags,” and that we revisit the same neural pathways               
to retrieve the content every time we attempt to recollect memories. But this view has been                
debunked since the 1930s but still remains among the common folk talk. The present,              
widely-accepted scientific theory of memory is that memorial recollection is reconstructive           
(Bartlett, 1932). That is, every time we recollect, we essentially reconstruct the memories             
using the stimuli we already have. We put together the stimuli in as exact a manner as                 
possible to recreate our memories. Despite the fact that there have been few objections, by               
now the view that ​memory is reconstructive is pretty much the unanimously accepted view              
in the cognitive sciences and psychology ​("Memory and Learning,” 2002; ​Wagoner, 2017).            
Indeed, this phenomenon is even more pronouncedly observable in socio-cultural settings           
(Wagoner, 2012). In Sir Frederic Bartlett’s own words: 
  
“Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and fragmentary           
traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction or construction, built out of the relation of our attitude                
towards a whole active mass of organised past reactions or experience, and to a little outstanding                
detail which commonly appears in image or in language form. It is thus hardly ever really exact,                 
even in the most rudimentary cases of rote recapitulation, and it is not at all important that be should                   
be so.” (Bartlett, 1932, pp.213-214). 
 
Granted that recollection of memories are nothing but reconstructions, there          
remains the question of how reconstruction is done. The answer is that reconstruction is              
done using the stimuli from the past environment. I argued above from a philosophical              
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 perspective that contents of memories are individuated by past, and not present,            
environment. It is also supported by empirical research which reassures us that the stimuli              
that reconstruction uses upon recall are stimuli from the past, provided one does not forget               
relevant details ​(Bartlett, 1968)​; if one does forget parts, or all, of the relevant stimuli from                
the past, one’s reconstruction is done using various other fitting stimuli to complete a              
picture which leads to the creation of false memories. Thus, ​misremembering, false            
memories, etc., are results of either misapplying the ‘assembling tools’ during           
reconstruction or of missing some stimuli. ​Thus, the theory of reconstruction can            
accommodate both correct and false memories making it a wholesome theory. 
Putting these two together,—reconstructive theory of memory and pastist         
externalism—it becomes apparent that when Oscar tries to remember what he thought of at              
t1, as the contents of his memory are individuated by the stimuli from the past               
environment, and, as he forgot nothing as granted by premise 2 (all the stimuli his mind                
would use in reconstruction is guaranteed to remain intact), he will have an accurate              
memory of what he thought of at t1. In other words, aided by accuracy in memorial                
reconstruction and content individuation by past environment, Oscar can have an absolute            
recollection that p—the thought he had at t1—also at t2, thereby rebutting premise 3. 
My reliance on the theory of memory as reconstructive might come off as a              
surprise to many a critic, for the preservationist view that philosophers in this debate              
favoured (or, took for granted), at least, had, at its core, the property of “freezing up”                
(fixing) past contents in one’s brain, whereas reconstructivism is notorious for destructing            
this happy picture of human memory. At the outset, my invoking reconstructivism, as it              
were, strengthens the camp that proponents of memory argument reside in, but we can see               
that my arguments succeed even in this reconstructivist view which does not, at its core,               
have this property of “fixing” past contents. Indeed, one of the central tenets of              
reconstructivist theory of memory is that the past contents need not be fixed in one’s mind.                
But, as I argued above, even this does not bother the compatibilist picture that I paint,                
given constraints such as not forgetting any relevant stimuli. So, to summarise my memory              
reconstruction argument: I pointed out that individuation of contents of memory depends            
on the past, and not present, environment; and, having done that, I argued that since               
recollection of memories is reconstructive, Oscar will fail to have water thoughts only if he               
forgets the relevant stimuli—such as the concept WATER. But premise 2 of the memory              
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 argument guarantees that Oscar will not forget any relevant stimuli, and therefore, Oscar             
will be able to remember his water thoughts that he had at t1 at t2, too. Thus, premise 3                   
that Oscar does not know that p is not true. Hence, we can abstain from reaching an                 
incompatibilist conclusion.  
Finally, before concluding this chapter, I summarise below the central claims and            
structure of the memory argument, followed by my opposing arguments: 
1. If Oscar does not forget anything relevant, then what he knows at t1, he knows at                
t2. 
2. Oscar forgot nothing relevant. 
3. By modus ponens from 1 and 2: if Oscar knows that p at t1, then he knows that p at                    
t2. 
4. If we have authoritative self-knowledge, then at t1, Oscar knows that Oscar thinks             
that p at t1. 
5. 3 and 4 logically entail that if we have authoritative self-knowledge, then at t2,              
Oscar knows that he thought that p at t1. 
6. If content externalism is true, then Oscar does not know that p at t2. 
7. If Oscar does not know that p at t2, then he does not know at t2 that he thought that                    
p at t1. 
8. 6 and 7 logically entail that if content externalism is true, then at t2, Oscar does not                 
know that he thought that p at t1. 
9. 5 and 8 logically entails that it is not the case that externalism is true and that we                  
have self-knowledge (or, in other words, that they are incompatible). 
 
In my argument against this formulation, I reject premise 6 that if externalism is              
true, then Oscar does not know that p at t2. To better illustrate, let us replace p with                  
“water”. I reject premise 6 with the following argumentation (we assume that content             
externalism is true for this argument and so I start with treating the consequent alone: that                
Oscar does not know that p at t2): 
1. Through my arguments in section 3.1, Oscar, in the case considered, does not             
acquire the concept TWATER at t2. 
2. Thus, his thought contents at both t1 and t2 express only WATER concept. 
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 3. If he only had the concept WATER at both t1 and t2, his memorial contents cannot                
have TWATER concept in them. 
4. Thus, at t2, Oscar, upon recollection, can express the concept WATER (thus,            
knows that p at t2)—this concludes the first part of my arguments in 3.2.1. 
5. Oscar will be able to learn and acquire TWATER concept after he was made              
cognisant of the switch. 
6. If he acquires TWATER concept sometime between t1 and t2, then he will be able               
to refer to twater when he uses “twater” at t2. 
7. In the case where he knows that t1 was before the switch, at t2, he will be able to                   
know that he had water thought at t1. 
8. In the case where he does not know when t1 happened, at t2, he will be able to                  
know that he either had water or twater thought at t1. 
a. Disjunctive type cases are not enough grounds to grant that Oscar does not             
know his own thought contents. 
9. By 7 and 8, whether or not Oscar knows when t1 occurred, at t2 Oscar can know                 
that he had water thoughts (or a disjunctive thought with water thought as one of               
the components) at t1. 
10. Thus, at t2, Oscar, upon recollection, can express the concept WATER (thus,            
knows that p at t2)—this concludes the second part of my argument in 3.2.1. 
11. If memory is reconstructive, then Oscar’s thought contents are individuated by his            
past environment. 
12. Memory is reconstructive. 
13. Thus, Oscar’s memorial contents depend on his past environment. 
a. At t1, Oscar’s environment had water. 
b. Memorial reconstruction would use this stimulus, namely water, to         
reconstruct his thoughts. 
14. If Oscar forgets nothing relevant, then his memorial recollection will reproduce           
exactly what he thought of at t1, namely water thoughts. 
15. Oscar forgot nothing relevant. 
16. Thus, at t2, Oscar, upon recollection, can express the concept WATER (thus,            
knows that p at t2)—this is my argument in 3.2.2. 
17. Thus, through 4, 10 and 17, in all the cases considered, Oscar knows that p at t2. 
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Thus, I reject premise 6 in my above summary and avoid being led to the               
incompatibilist conclusion. With this, I complete my arguments against the plausibility of            
slow-switching cases in establishing incompatibility between content externalism and         
authoritative self-knowledge. In this way, I point out that premise 3 of the memory              
argument can be rejected as Oscar’s memorial thought contents do not change            
unbeknownst to him upon recollection. This is true of both the cases where Oscar knows of                
the switch (and, thus, learns the concept TWATER) and does not know of the switch as I                 
argued above. Therefore, the memory argument does not succeed in demonstrating that            
content externalism is incompatible with authoritative self-knowledge. 
Before concluding the thesis in chapter 5, I address four potential objections in the              
next chapter. 
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 4. REPLIES TO POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
This chapter examines some of the possible objections that my arguments above            
may receive, and provides my responses to them. 
4.1 ON DEFERENCE 
One can object to my argument that thought contents can change unknown to the              
agent through the mechanism of deference. We can defer to experts in the linguistic              
community and have our thought contents individuated; have the community fix the            
contents of our thoughts unknown to us. However, I think that deference results in the               
agent thinking that he is talking about something but the community, with the agent’s              
deference, interpreting him differently. The agent will acquire the new concept only if the              
agent can himself distinguish between the two concepts. Until then the agent might defer to               
the community but still may fail to possess the new concept. 
To see how this would work, let us move away from the problematic water/twater              
example and take Burge’s arthritis example for socio-linguistic externalism . Consider the           12
case of twin Bert who lives on twin earth and whose linguistic community uses tharthritis               
to refer to ailments of both the joints and the muscles. Suppose that twin Bert was switched                 
to earth without his knowledge and lives on earth for a long time. Let him causally interact                 
with arthritis patients on earth who may use various linguistic expressions with the word              
“arthritis.” Twin Bert, of course, does not have any idea that by “arthritis,” earthians              
express a different concept and that he, as a twin-earthian, possesses a different concept for               
the same word. During his usage, he defers to the experts in earthian community. Since the                
twin-earthian concept encompasses both the ailments of thighs and joints, when twin Bert,             
who develops an inflammation on his knees, use that word, earthians do not suspect              
anything and interpret him as though he meant arthritis; and, as tharthritis applies to this               
case, too, Twin Bert has no reason to suspect the earthian usage, and assumes that they use                 
12 As is pointed out by countless subsequent literature that Putnam inspired, the usage of water as an example                   
has many unwanted side effects such as human body being made up of 70% water (H​2​O), or that natural                   
kinds being rigid designators, and so on. 
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 the same concept that he uses . He defers to the experts and if the deference were to                 13
bestow him with the earthian concept he would have known that he cannot use the word                
for inflammation of his thighs. But he still retains his twin earthian concept             
THARTHRITIS and always expresses on earth, too. Thus, despite deferring, he fails to             
have his thought contents changed. Even ​if he, by pure chance or wild guess, does become                
suspicious, he would investigate and would end up learning of the (new) earthian concept.              
This case, too, fails to threaten my argument as his thought contents changed now with his                
awareness, with his conscious efforts. ​Now let us suppose that he develops an             
inflammation in his thighs. Having learnt on twin earth that tharthritis can occur (also) on               
the thigh, twin Bert goes to an earthian doctor and reports (by which he defers to the                 
experts), “I have tharthritis on my thighs.” The earthian doctor on earth would correct twin               
Bert that arthritis is an ailment that applies only to inflammation of joints and not thighs.                
Then twin Bert would have come to learn through active cognitive participation the new              
concept ARTHRITIS. In this case, suppose post his visit to doctor he was told that he had                 
undergone slow-switching, he would realise that there are two different concepts and            
would learn of factors that distinguish arthritis and tharthritis. The advantage this example             
has is that it illustrates that twin Bert’s causal interaction with earthian object—namely,             
arthritis, in this case—is not enough to bring about a change in his concepts. ​Thus, in all                 
the cases whether or not he was made aware of the slow-switching, Oscar can continue to                
defer to experts but it is still not enough for him to acquire a twin concept. 
By that, I do not deny that one can learn concepts through deference. Obviously, if               
one comes across a new concept, in deferring to experts, one learns of its usage, its                
applicability, its truth conditions, and so on, which are enough to grant that this agent               
possesses this concept this agent is not previously exposed to. But deference in the              
slow-switching cases, where there are two mutually indistinguishable concepts available,          
does not have any effect on the agent acquiring the twin concept. That is, Doscar from Dry                 
13 The case, of course, would be different if we switch earthian Bert to twin earth. He would, at the very first                      
instance, when a twin-earthian shows his puffed-up thigh and says, “I have tharthritis,” would attempt to                
correct this twin-earthian person, and, that would, much to his surprise or dismay, lead him to discover that                  
he had learnt it all wrong. Post learning this, he may even abandon his previous concept (this is assuming that                    
he has no clue that he had been switched; if he knows of the switch, he, would, of course, attempt to acquire                      
tharthritis concept and retain both the concepts). His abandoning the earthian concept in the former case is a                  
different matter altogether (he knowingly dropped it) and, for the purposes of the present argument, is                
inessential.  
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 Earth (an earth that does not have any water), when exposed to water (or, slow-switched to                
earth), can, through deference, causal interaction, etc., come to possess the concept            
WATER but when, again, slow-switched to twin earth, will not be able to acquire              
TWATER unless and until he learns of the molecular differences between water and             
twater. Doscar’s case, you will notice, is akin to that of a newborn baby which necessarily                
need not consciously learn of the concepts WATER, SOFA, ARTHRITIS, etc., when she             
first encounters a concept, but if slow-switched to another relevant alternative           
environment, she will fail to acquire the twin concept unless she becomes capable of              
distinguishing between the two concepts. 
4.2 NATURAL KINDS AS PRIMITIVE CONCEPTS? 
A persistent critic can point out the possibility of natural kinds being a primitive              
concept in our mind’s conceptual schema. If natural kinds turn out to be one of those                
unlearnable, innate, primitive concepts, then Oscar can, in the presence of twater,            
automatically come to acquire the concept TWATER—why, he can acquire it even when             
there is a poverty of this stimulus! To such a critic, I would say that, yes, it could be the                    
case, but even in that case, as I already did point out in section 3.1, (i) natural kinds are not                    
primitive concepts, and (ii) even if we are wrong about that, primitive concepts must              
nonetheless be learned (Margolis, 1998; Laurence and Margolis, 2011). Also, just to            
clarify: learning could be semi-/unconscious, too. This point was raised to rebuff the notion              
that there are certain concepts that cannot be learned. 
Does this mean that all concepts are to be learned consciously by the agent? Am I                
saying that this is how infants learn? No, the need for conscious learning is applicable only                
to concepts that are indistinguishable superficially. Obviously children, or even adults,           
when they acquire a new concept don’t make conscious cognitive efforts to learn the              
concept. They learn to grab a concept just by interacting with it causally. Say, when a child                 
first learns what a bolt is she need not know the microstructure, how it is used, and so on.                   
But upon encountering two different types of bolts that look exactly similar (say, in              
engineering school) and are made up of the same material, she should learn to distinguish               
that the two bolts are made up of exactly the same molecules but differ only in how they                  
were heat-treated that gives rise to each of them slightly different physical properties. That              
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 is, it is possible for a screw and a bolt to be both be made up of a same grade of medium                      
carbon steel, subjected to same types of heat-treatment to harden it, and so on, so that both                 
end up having the same physical and chemical properties. The only difference between             
these two is their use—bolts are used in joints that are unthreaded and always take up a                 
nut, whereas screws are used in joints that are threaded and do not take up a nut. It is not                    
possible to know that SCREW and BOLT are different concepts without knowing the             
conventions associated with it. No matter how long a person spends on a twin environment               
(earth, engineering facility, etc.), causally interacting, in such almost-indistinguishable         
cases—like those the entire slow-switching arguments are based on—change in their           
mental contents will not take place. 
I, thus, only argue against automatic content switch as was supposed to happen by              
incompatibilists who forward the slow-switching thought experiment. It is possible for an            
agent who has never been acquainted to a concept of a certain kind—say, a new social                
convention—to acquire it just through causal interaction. If this agent were to get exposed              
to something indistinguishable from this particular concept, then the agent should, as I             
suggest, consciously learn to distinguish the two. Until then the agent will keep using              
linguistic expressions and thoughts that expresses, and refers to, the older concept that the              
agent is already acquainted with. 
4.3 ON THE PROSPECT OF MISCOMMUNICATION 
If Oscar, in his interactions with twin-earthians, means water whereas the           
twin-earthians interpret him as meaning twater, doesn’t it indicate that there is a             
miscommunication here? Doesn’t that mean that every time an agent switches their            
environment, unless the agent learns of the new concept (or defers to the community),              
there is a miscommunication? We often change our environment (such as Ludlow’s            
examples of Biff and the meaning of “pragmatism” in two different communities in             
(Ludlow, 1995a)) and, if I were to latch on to my claims, it might suggest that there is                  
always a constant miscommunication when we speak to others. 
To this objection, I bite the bullet and grant that a harmless miscommunication             
ensues. Even in normal day-to-day conversations of very ordinary concepts, it is highly             
implausible to suppose that one person understands the other person perfectly. No one is              
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 able to communicate exactly what one thought of, what one meant to convey, and yet the                
recipient understands much of what the communicator intended to express and acts in             
accordance to it. There is always a miscommunication in every single interaction we have              
with others but yet manage to get by without any problems. This cannot be downplayed as                
the problem of mediation of one’s thoughts through language is considered one of the              
central problems in ordinary language philosophy. I, thus, appeal to such commonsensical            
transactions where people are totally fine using mutually indistinguishable concepts at no            
cost to themselves. Two concepts C1 and C2 may coexist in an agent’s mind unless severe                
repercussions/misunderstandings take place. If the latter occurs, the agent will be forced to             
distinguish the two concepts, and the agent may do it with the aid of some conceptual                
learning framework (such as molecular differences in our water/twater scenario). By           
“harmless,” I mean that it will not give rise to any severe repercussions. If there be any                 
severe repercussion—such as being grossly misunderstood—that would lead to the agent           
realising that the nature of the concept they possess might be wrong/outdated, and they              
then would change/update it accordingly (or will be unwilling to change, but the point here               
is that they will become aware that there is a difference). Thus, to repeat, I grant that there                  
is a miscommunication only in the theoretical sense of the word; for all the practical               
purposes, this does not matter and that the agent will be able to succeed in their                
transactions with the external world. 
This might appear to be an extremist view of communications, as one can argue              
that communications need not be perfect in order to be understood. But if one is willing to                 
permit the latter why not the former?  
4.4 AGAINST ABSOLUTE RECOLLECTION 
Now one might object that it is not possible to forget nothing and recollect              
absolutely. We have to, in line with our fantastical thought experiment, assume that             
Oscar’s memorial reconstruction will be perfect. I mention this only in order to provide the               
memory argument a charitable reading. But if the critic were to press even further, I can                
argue that the possibility of absolute recollection is not as far-fetched as it may sound.               
Indeed, Bartlett himself is not against—what I term—absolute recollection. He writes: 
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 “I did not say, I think I did not imply, that literal retrieval is impossible, but I did imply that                    
it requires special constricting conditions. I specified certain social conditions in which this seems              
particularly likely to occur. [...] Nothing that I wrote was intended to deny the possibility of this, and                  
if any of the statements in the theoretical parts of the book seem to imply such denial they must have                    
been badly phrased.” (Bartlett, 1968, section 3). 
 
In special constricting situations, absolute recollection is possible and there were           
even famous cases of people being able to recount every event in accurate detail about               
every single day of their lives. This is, of course, not germane to the current domain of                 
discussion but is only meant to showcase that what a critic might take as preposterous is                
actually possible, and, that, is very much consistent with our thought experiment. 
Leaving aside the fantastical thought experiment, we are faced with one more            
question: what would the actual role be that the environment can play? It will only be                
along the following lines. We would, I maintain, still have the same content in our               
memories, however diluted we may feel the associated propositional attitudes be—indeed,           
this is the case with our memories: when we remember certain mental episode, we              
certainly retain the same propositional attitude but in time, it may get diluted (or, get               
enhanced, in certain rare cases)—as is the case with traumatic memories, happy, sad             
thoughts, and so on. Dilution occurs usually when you forget all the nitty-gritty details of               
the memory (with premise 2 ensuring us that dilution will not happen to Oscar in our                
thought experiment). That is not to say that, provided the agent forgets none of the relevant                
stimuli from the past, the external environment will not affect an agent’s memory at all, but                
only that the external environment can dilute (or, enhance, in rare cases) the vividness of               
an agent’s memory, but it does not, and cannot, switch the inner content. Changes in               
contents of the agent’s memory will take place only in cases where the agent forgets parts                
of the past stimuli and replaces the missing parts with available parts, thereby leading to               
misremembering, formation and recollection of false memories, memorial delusions, etc.          
But, coupled with my argument that contents don’t change, even this case does not lead us                
to the incompatibilist conclusion. 
So far in this chapter, I addressed four potential objections to my thesis and              
attempted to defend my stance. I take it that my defence is successful. Thus I conclude that                 
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 the arguments advanced through slow-switching cases do not succeed in establishing the            
incompatibility thesis. 
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 5. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I argued that both the variants of the slow-switching arguments that              
aim to establish the incompatibility thesis—that content externalism is incompatible with           
authoritative self-knowledge—fail in its aim owing to two reasons: the first one being a              
rejection of the assumption that an agent’s concepts can automatically change through            
causal interaction with their surroundings, and the second one being the nature of             
recollection of memories not permitting the changes in memorial contents of the kind             
claimed by incompatibilists to occur. Thus, it can be concluded that slow switching             
arguments do not succeed in establishing the incompatibility of content externalism and            
authoritative self-knowledge. Having said that, an obvious question now remains: if           
authoritative self-knowledge and content externalism are compatible, what is the          
relationship between the two? What kind of influence does the external environment exert             
on our authoritative self-knowledge, or how does it inform us, if at all, of our own                
thoughts? As this is beyond the scope of this thesis, I shall not take up this now. This could                   
be the subject of another paper. 
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 ABSTRACT 
 
ON THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF SLOW-SWITCHING ARGUMENTS 
IN ESTABLISHING INCOMPATIBILISM 
 
Philosophers who argue that content externalism is incompatible with authoritative 
self-knowledge usually employ one of the two arguments namely the slow-switching           
argument and the reductio ad absurdum. Of these I focus on only the former which in itself                 
has two variants namely the content-switch (main argument) and the memory argument (a             
variant). I argue against both the variants thereby denying that slow-switching arguments            
succeed in establishing the incompatibility thesis. 
It is long held that if a slow-switched agent (Oscar) were to stay long enough on                
twin earth, his thought contents change unbeknownst to him. And it was reasoned that,              
since Oscar is unaware of the changes in his mental contents and cannot spot when the                
changes occurred, he does not have access to his own thought contents at all times, which                
thereby leads to the conclusion that authoritative self-knowledge is incompatible with           
externalism. In this thesis, I argue that, in cases like these, mental contents do not change                
unknown to Oscar. I appeal to theories of concept acquisition to achieve this end. This               
forms my attack on the main argument. And, as against the memory argument, I use two                
strategies the first one of which is an extension of the previous argument applied to this                
case; and the second strategy is to argue that memorial recollection depends on the past,               
and not the present, environment and, if Oscar does not forget any relevant past stimuli, his                
memorial contents upon recollection will not change. Having thus argued against both the             
variants of the slow-switching arguments, I conclude that slow-switching arguments do not            
succeed in establishing the incompatibility thesis. 
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